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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CITY OF ST. GEORGE, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ] 
vs . 
STEVEN REESE CARTER, ] 
Defendant and Appellee. ] 
) Case No. 960704-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
L JimisnxcriDN 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. Sections 77-18a-l(2)(a) (Supp. 1996) and 78-2a-
3(2)(f) (Supp. 1996), and in accordance with Rule 26, Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure and State v. Trover, 866 P.2d 528 (Utah 
1993) . 
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II- ISSUES PRESENTED 
(A) Did the district court err in concluding that when 
Officer Whipple's encounter with the defendant, prior to having 
him exit his vehicle, disclosed no supporting evidence of a 
crime, there was no legal basis for Officer Whipple's subsequent 
actions? 
The district court's legal conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Utah 1995) . 
This issue arose out of the district court's ruling on the 
defendant's Motion to Suppress. R. 143-47. 
(B) Did the district court err in concluding that any 
evidence which was developed after Officer Whipple asked the 
defendant to exit the vehicle was obtained in violation of the 
Defendant's constitutional guarantees of freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures? 
The district court's legal conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Utah 1995). 
This issue arose out of the district court's ruling on the 
defendant's Motion to Suppress. R. 143-47. 
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DETERMINATIVE 
Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution 
Article I, Section 14, Utah Constitution 
Utah Code Ann., Section 77-7-15 (1995) 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
This is a Troyer appeal from the district court's order 
suppressing evidence and the conclusions of law on which that 
order is based. 
On January 13, 1995, the plaintiff filed an Information 
charging the defendant with committing the following crimes: (1) 
driving under the influence of alcohol; (2) possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana); (3) open container; and (4) 
possession of paraphernalia. R. 1-2. 
Around April 7, 1995, the defendant moved the district court 
for an order suppressing all physical evidence and observations 
made in connection with the defendant's stop and detention on the 
grounds that he was stopped, detained, and ordered out of his 
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vehicle in violation of his constitutional right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. R. 14-15. 
On June 12, 1996, a hearing was held on the defendant's 
Motion to Suppress. R. 143. At the close of the hearing, the 
district court made the following conclusions of law: 
(1) Officer Whipple acted within the scope of his authority 
and duty in approaching the defendant's vehicle, signaling that 
the defendant should not leave his position, and in approaching 
the vehicle and talking to the occupants. 
(2) When the officer's encounter with the occupants of the 
vehicle, prior to having them exit the vehicle, disclosed no 
supporting evidence of the commission of any public offense, 
there was no legal basis for the officer's subsequent actions. 
(3) Any evidence which developed after the officer asked 
the occupants to step out of the vehicle was obtained in 
violation of the defendant's constitutional guarantees of freedom 
from unreasonable searches and seizures. R. 146. 
Based on the foregoing conclusions of law, the district 
court ordered that all observations, analyses, and items of 
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physical evidence made, conducted, or seized after the defendant 
was required to exit his motor vehicle be suppressed. R. 146-47. 
On October 4, 1996, the district court, pursuant to State v. 
Trover, 866 P.2d 528 (Utah 1993), dismissed the charges against 
the defendant with prejudice on the grounds that the district 
court's order granting the defendant's Motion to Suppress 
substantially impaired the plaintiff's case. R. 154, 148-153; 
State v. Trover, 866 P.2d 528 (Utah 1993). 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR 
REVIEW 
On Friday, September 30, 1994, Ricky Hafen was working as an 
employee of the Arby's Restaurant located at the corner of 700 
South and Bluff Street in St. George, Utah. While working at the 
drive-through window that evening, he observed the defendant in 
the driver's seat of a motor vehicle. R. 143. 
The occupants of the vehicle purchased food from the Arby's 
Restaurant and then proceeded on to the public street. While the 
vehicle was still outside the drive-through window, Mr. Hafen 
observed an open can of Keystone beer in the defendant's lap. 
Furthermore, he saw the defendant take a drink from that can as 
he left the drive-through window and proceeded toward the public 
5 
street. At that time, the can appeared to be half full. Hafen 
watched the vehicle until it pulled into the public street, and 
he did not see the defendant throw the Keystone beer can out of 
the vehicle. R. 144. 
Hafen called police dispatch to report his observations. 
Hafen told dispatch that there was a driver who just left the 
Arby's drive-through window who had an open container. Hafen 
ultimately provided the location and a description of the vehicle 
which included the license plate number. Hafen did not receive 
any consideration from the St. George Police Department for 
providing this information. Officer Whipple was the first 
officer to arrive at the scene. He recalled that dispatch 
broadcast the following information: (1) there was a possible 
open container subject at the Arby's Restaurant; (2) an Arby's 
employee had seen an open container in a vehicle; (3) the vehicle 
left the drive-through window; (4) the vehicle was a small white 
compact pickup with a shell on it; and (5) there were two 
occupants in the vehicle. The foregoing description matched the 
general description of the vehicle the defendant was driving. 
Officer Whipple did not recall the broadcast of any information 
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indicating that the vehicle had parked on 700 South after leaving 
the restaurant. R. 144-46. 
Officer Whipple approached Arby's from Bluff Street and 
proceeded eastbound on 700 South. He observed that the vehicle 
which dispatch had described was not in the area of the Arby's 
drive-through window. He observed the defendant's vehicle on 700 
South and drove past it in order to see if he could make any 
further observations which would indicate whether or not it was 
the vehicle described in the radio dispatch. After observing two 
occupants in the vehicle eating, Officer Whipple determined to 
contact the individuals. He positioned his patrol car behind the 
defendant's vehicle and turned on the overhead lights. R. 14 5. 
Officer Whipple approached the vehicle and contacted the 
driver who was eating food which had obviously been purchased 
from the Arby's Restaurant. Officer Whipple told the occupants 
of the vehicle why he was there and asked them if they had been 
drinking and if they had any open alcoholic beverage containers 
in the vehicle. They denied drinking and denied having any such 
containers. R. 145. 
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Officer Whipple could not observe any such containers from 
his vantage point outside the vehicle. He did not smell the odor 
of any alcoholic beverage but could smell the aroma of the food 
which the occupants of the vehicle were eating. Officer Whipple 
did not, with any of his senses, detect anything which confirmed 
the presence of an open container in the vehicle or which led him 
to believe that there was any criminal conduct afoot. He asked 
the occupants for identification and ran the information through 
dispatch. He then concluded that everything seemed to be all 
right. R. 145-46. 
At that point, Officer Whipple asked the occupants to step 
out of the vehicle because he wanted to see if he could detect 
the odor of alcohol on their breath when they were separated from 
the food aroma. Once the defendant was outside the vehicle 
engaging in conversation with Officer Whipple, Officer Whipple 
detected the slight odor of alcohol. It was this observation 
which led to the escalation of the investigation and the 
defendant's arrest. R. 146. 
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V, SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Officer Whipple's initial seizure was an investigative level 
two stop. A level two stop must meet the following two-prong 
Terry test to overcome the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against 
unreasonable seizures: (1) the initial stop must be justified by 
reasonable suspicion; and (2) the police officer's actions after 
the stop must be within the scope of the circumstances justifying 
the stop. 
In the present case, it should be assumed for the purposes 
of this appeal that the first prong of the Terry test was met 
(the initial stop was supported by reasonable suspicion that the 
defendant had an open container in the vehicle). 
Therefore, the only question which is determinative to the 
issues presented in this appeal deals with the second prong of 
the Terry test: Were Officer Whipple's actions after the stop 
within the scope of the circumstances justifying the stop? The 
answer to that question is yes. 
In determining whether the detention after a level two stop 
exceeds the scope of the circumstances justifying the stop, the 
Court has: (a) balanced the need for the detention against the 
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invasion which the detention entails; and (b) determined whether 
the police officer diligently pursued a means of investigation 
that was likely to confirm or dispel his suspicions quickly. 
In the instant case, the need for the detention (separating 
the defendant from the food aroma to see if the odor of an 
alcohol beverage could be detected) outweighs the invasion which 
the detention entailed (the defendant exiting the vehicle). 
Furthermore, Officer Whipple diligently pursued a means of 
investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel his suspicions 
quickly. 
Therefore, Officer Whipple's actions after the stop were 
within the scope of the circumstances justifying the stop, and 
Officer Whipple's seizure of the defendant was lawful. 
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YI^_ARGDMENT 
OFFICER WHIPPLE'S INVESTIGATIVE LEVEL TWO SEIZURE OF THE 
DEFENDANT WAS LAWFUL BECAUSE: (A) THE STOP WAS JUSTIFIED BY 
REASONABLE SUSPICION; AND (B) OFFICER WHIPPLE'S ACTIONS AFTER THE 
STOP WERE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING THE 
STOP. 
In the present case, Officer Whipple seized the defendant 
based on reasonable suspicion that the defendant had an open 
alcohol container in his vehicle in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
41-6-44.20. S^e R. 143-46. This seizure was an investigative 
level two stop. See State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 
1987) (per curiam); Utah Code Ann. Section 77-7-15 (1995) 
(codification of level two stop); R. 143-46. 
A level two stop must meet the following two-prong Terry 
test to overcome the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against 
unreasonable seizures: (A) the initial stop must be justified by 
reasonable suspicion; and (B) the police officer's actions after 
the stop must be within the scope of the circumstances justifying 
the stop. State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994) 
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968)). 
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A. The Stop Was Justified by Reasonable Suspicion. 
In the present case, it should be assumed for the purposes 
of this appeal that the first prong of the lexry test was met 
(the initial stop was supported by reasonable suspicion that the 
defendant had an open container in the vehicle) . See R. 143-46.1 
Therefore, the only question which is determinative to the 
issues presented in this appeal deals with the second prong of 
the Terry test: Were Officer Whipple's actions after the stop 
within the scope of the circumstances justifying the stop? As 
the following discussion illustrates, the answer to that question 
is yes. 
B. Officer Whipple's Actions After the Stop Were Within 
the Scope of the Circumstances Justifying the Stop. 
There is no bright-line rule for determining whether the 
detention after a level two stop is within the scope of the 
circumstances justifying the stop; instead, the Court, in making 
At the close of the suppression hearing, the district 
court made the following conclusion of law: "Officer Whipple 
acted within the scope of his authority and duty in approaching 
the Defendant's vehicle, signaling that the defendant should not 
leave his position, and in approaching the vehicle and talking to 
the occupants." R. 4. There has been no appeal related to this 
conclusion of law. 
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this determination, has: (1) balanced the need for the detention 
against the invasion which the detention entails; and (2) 
determined whether the police officer "diligently pursued a means 
of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their 
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain 
the defendant." State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah App. 
19 91) (w'common sense and ordinary human experience must govern 
over rigid criteria'") (quoting State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 
884 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 
675, 685 (1985)); Statft v. Qttesen, 920 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah App. 
1996) (citing T^rry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). 
1. The need for the detention outweighed the invasion 
which the detention entailed. 
In the present case, once there was reasonable suspicion 
that the defendant had an open container in his vehicle, Officer 
Whipple had not only the right but the duty to investigate to 
confirm or dispel that suspicion. State v. Baumgartel, 762 P.2d 
2, 5 (Utah App. 1988). 
Officer Whipple's initial contact with the defendant (he 
approached the vehicle, contacted the occupants, told them why he 
was there, asked them if they had been drinking or if they had 
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any open containers) did not yield any evidence of an open 
container. R. 145-46. Officer Whipple could not smell the odor 
of any alcoholic beverage, but he could smell the aroma of the 
Arby's food the defendant and his passenger were eating. R. 145. 
Officer Whipple wanted to see if he could detect the odor of 
alcohol on the Defendant's breath when he was separated from the 
food aroma so he had him exit the vehicle. R. 14 6. This was 
necessary because the aroma of the food was masking the odor of 
alcohol. £Lee. R. 145-46. The need to determine whether there was 
an open container in the vehicle is heightened by public safety 
concerns related to people drinking alcohol in vehicles on 
highways, and, again, at the time of the initial stop, there was 
reasonable suspicion that the defendant had an open container in 
his vehicle. 
In the present case, the "invasion" which the detention 
entailed is simply the defendant exiting his vehicle. R. 146. 
The United States Supreme Court has characterized the 
intrusion of having a person exit their vehicle after they have 
been lawfully stopped as: "de minimis;" "not a 'serious 
intrusion upon the sanctity of the person;'" "hardly ris[ing] to 
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the level of a 'petty indignity;'" and a "mere inconvenience." 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (citation 
omitted). 
In Minims, two police officers stopped a driver for driving a 
car with an expired license plate. One of the officers ordered 
the driver to exit the car. When the driver exited the car, the 
officer noticed a bulge under the driver's jacket which turned 
out to be a firearm. The driver was eventually convicted of 
weapons violations. Xd. at 107-08. The Supreme Court, in 
deciding whether the order to exit the car was reasonable and 
thus permissible under the Fourth Amendment, balanced the 
officer's interest in having the driver exit the car against the 
intrusion which resulted from the order to exit the car. Id. at 
109-111. The state argued that, although the officer did not 
suspect foul play from the driver at the time of the stop, it was 
the officer's practice, as a precautionary measure, to have 
drivers exit their cars whenever they had been stopped for a 
traffic violation. Id. at 110. The Supreme Court, after giving 
the foregoing characterization of the intrusion of being ordered 
to exit the car, ruled that such an intrusion ucannot prevail 
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when balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer's 
safety." Xd. The Court went on to state: "We only hold that 
once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detai[n]ed for a traffic 
violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out of 
the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment's proscription 
of unreasonable searches and seizures." Xd. at n.6.2 
The Court's analysis and holding in Mimms supports the 
conclusion that, in the present case, the need for the detention 
outweighed the invasion which the detention entailed, and Officer 
Whipple's actions after the stop were lawful. 
2. Officer Whipple diligently pursued a means of 
investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel 
his suspicions quickly. 
After his initial contact with the defendant did not yield 
any evidence of an open container, Officer Whipple wanted to see 
if he could detect the odor of alcohol on the Defendant's breath 
when he was separated from the food aroma which was coming from 
the vehicle in which the defendant was seated; therefore, he had 
This statement was made in response to a suggestion in 
Justice Stevens' dissent that the Supreme Court was holding that 
whenever an officer has occasion to speak to a driver, the 
officer may order the driver out of the car. Xd. 
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the defendant exit the vehicle. R. 146. 
This was clearly a means of investigation that was likely to 
confirm or dispel Officer Whipple's suspicions quickly, and 
Officer Whipple pursued those means in a diligent and reasonable 
manner. 
In sum, Officer Whipple's actions after the initial stop 
were within the scope of the circumstances justifying the stop, 
and Officer Whipple's seizure of the defendant was lawful. 
VII, ^CONCLUSION 
Officer Whipple's investigative level two seizure of the 
defendant was lawful because: (a) the stop was justified by 
reasonable suspicion; and (b) Officer Whipple's actions after the 
stop were within the scope of the circumstances justifying the 
stop. 
Therefore, the plaintiff respectfully requests this Court 
to: (a) reverse the district court's order suppressing all 
evidence that was developed after Officer Whipple had the 
defendant exit his vehicle; (b) reverse the district court's 
order dismissing the charges against the defendant; and (c) 
remand the present case for further proceedings. 
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1 DATED this I day of February, 1997. 
? 
Paul E. Dame 
City Prosecutor 
Certificate of Delivery 
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City Prosecutor 
Certificate of Delivery 
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APPELLANT were mailed, first class postage prepaid, to Robin 
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/ / ^ -
Paul E. Dame 
City Prosecutor 
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the defendant exit the vehicle. P. M h . 
This was cieaily ,i nii'.-nin D1 J. nvest igat ii »ii that vet." ! i I: 1; I 
confirm or dispel Officer Whipple's suspicions quickly, and 
Officer Whipple pursued those means :i i i a d:i I i gent: ai id r easoi lable 
manner. 
In sum., Otticer Whipple's actions atter the initial stop 
were within the scope of the circumstances justifying the stop, 
and Officer Whipple's seizure of the defendai it was lawful. 
VII, CONCLUSION 
Officer Whipple's investigative level two seizure of the 
defendant was lawful because: (a) the stop was justified by 
reasonable suspicion; and (b) Officer Whipple's actions after the 
s t op we r e w i t: h :il i 1 t he s c op e c f 11 i 2 c ire urns tances j u s t i f y i ng the 
stop. 
Therefore r h^ | < 1 .1 i nt i. P f respectful 1 y requests this Court 
to: (a) reverse the district court's order suppressing all 
e -< ;r i d e n c e t h a t w a s d e A e ] o p e d a f t e r Officer W h i p p 1 e had the 
defendant exit his vehicle; (b) reverse the district court's 
order d isi ai ssii lg t:l HE ::1: larges agai nst the defendant; and ( :::) 
remand the present case for further proceedings. 
DATED this H day of February, 1997, 
,/*/ 2 ^ 
Paul E. Dame 
City Prosecutor 
Certificate of Delivery 
On the V day of ^f^fiLdrJ , 1997, I caused two true 
and exact copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be 
delivered to Gary W. Pendleton, 150 North 200 East, Suite 202, 
St. George, Utah. 
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^V^t^tvi 
Cer t i f i ca te of Delivery 
I hereby ce r t i fy that on the H day of rtbfXJLct^x 
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APPELLANT were mailed, first class postage prepaid, to Robin 
Hutcheson, Deputy Clerk, Utah Court of Appeals, 230 South 500 
East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
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ADDENDUM 
Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution 
[Unreasonable
 s e a r ches and seizures.] The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 14, Utah State Constitution 
[Unreasonable searches forbidden--Issuance of warrant.] The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1.9 95, Section 7 7 7- 15. 
Authority of peace officer to stop and question suspect--
Grounds. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when 
he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is 
in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public 
offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of 
his actions. 
Aj 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
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SUPPRESS 
Case No. 955500015 TC 
Judge James L. Shumate 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on June 12, 
1996, on Defendant's motion to suppress. The City appeared by and 
through Paul Dame, city Prosecutur DetendcMiL appeared in fa::rj» n 
and through counsel, Gary W. Pendleton. The Court, having heard 
the 1-'?:--, t i ninny i,l Pi'*ky Hafen and Officer Jason Whipple and the 
arguments of counsel, and being !;uJly advj.'.^ jd in the [JI eiiiJ b^ L., 
makes the following: 
FI1 IDINGS ur "ACT 
1, On Friday, September ;n *•QC . Ricky Hafen was work] i lg as 
an erp:cv-{, •;: f the Arby • s Restaurant located at the corner of 700 
£ " • : i S t r e e t :i i i S t: G< sorge, Utah. Whi le working at the 
drive-through window that evening,, he observed the Defendant :i i I tl le 
driver's seat of a motor vehicle. 
2. The occupants of the vehicle purchased food from the 
Arbyfs Restaurant and then proceeded on to the public street. 
While the vehicle was still outside the drive-through window, Mr. 
Hafen observed an open can of Keystone beer in the Defendant's lap. 
Furthermore, he saw the Defendant take a drink from that can as he 
left the drive-through window and proceeded toward the public 
street. At that time, the can appeared to be half full. Hafen 
watched the vehicle until it pulled into the public street, and he 
did not see the Defendant throw the Keystone beer can out of the 
vehicle. 
3. Hafen called the police dispatcher to report his 
observations. Hafen told dispatch that there was a driver who just 
left the Arby's drive-through window who had an open container. 
Hafen ultimately provided the location and a description of the 
vehicle which included the license plate number. Hafen did not 
receive any consideration from the St. George Police Department for 
providing this information. Officer Whipple was the first officer 
to arrive at the scene. He recalled that dispatch broadcast the 
following information: (a) there was a possible open container 
subject at the Arby's Restaurant; (b) an Arby's employee had seen 
an open container in a vehicle; © the vehicle left the drive-
through window; (d) the vehicle was a small white compact pickup 
with a shell on it; and (e) there were two occupants in the 
vehicle. The foregoing description matched the general description 
of the vehicle the Defendant was driving. Officer Whipple did not 
2 R. 144 
recall the troadcast of any information indicating that the vehicle 
had parked en / i outn attei. ledvuig the rei: t "iur ant. 
I: Whipple approached Arby's from Bluff Street and proceeded 
eistbouriil " ' fir nth. He observed that the vehicle which 
dispatch had described was not in the arj.i ui i In:' Arb;- ';. •:' :". /e-
througti window. He observed the Defendant's vehicle on 7 00 South 
aiii 1 r v-* p i f i1' • r!r• f• to see if he could make any further 
observations which would indicate whether or not i I. wau Lliu vehicle 
described In the radio dispatch. After observing two occupants in 
the vehic Le eaI: i ii-.j 0f f i<:er' Wh Ipp le determined r o contact the 
individuals. He positioned his patrol car behind the Uetenda.:. 
vehicle and turned on the overhead lights. 
Whippie dppi oaehed L11e ,/ehioJ e arui «">"mtacted the driver 
who was eating food which had obviously been purchased from the 
Arby's Restaurant. TIV officer told the occupants of the vehicle 
why he was there and asked U I I I d inVLno ,MV1 if 
they had any open alcoholic beverage containers in the vehicle. 
They denim drinHnq in«l denied having any such containers. 
ii. 'The officer could not observe any tiiiUi "mi* i intio trum 1M i 
vantage point outside* the vehicle. He did not nniell the odor or 
any a I coh d • ' b«iv°raiv"' but could smell fh^ ar(^\i of the food which 
the occupants o f t h« s v e h i c 1 e were e a t i i l g ' I' In" D f f i c e i :i 1 I i I • : t , 
with any of his senses, detect anything which confirmed the 
preseni'i n »n op".MI '' n n t: a i ne r in the vehicle or which led him to 
believe that there was any criminal conduct afoot, He asked LI if 
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occupants for identification and ran the information through 
dispatch. He then concluded that everything seemed to be alright. 
7. At that point, he asked the occupants to step out of the 
vehicle because he wanted to see if he could detect the odor of 
alcohol on their breath when they were separated from the food 
aroma. Once the Defendant was outside the vehicle engaging in 
conversation with Officer Whipple, the officer detected the slight 
odor of alcohol. It was this observation which lead to the 
escalation of the investigation and Defendant's arrest. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Officer Whipple acted within the scope of his authority 
and duty in approaching the Defendant's vehicle, signaling that the 
Defendant should not leave his position, and in approaching the 
vehicle and talking to the occupants. 
2. When the officer's encounter with the occupants of the 
vehicle, prior to having them exit the vehicle, disclosed no 
supporting evidence of the commission of any public offense, there 
was no legal basis for the officer's subsequent actions. 
3. Any evidence which developed after the officer asked the 
occupants to step out of the vehicle was obtained in violation of 
the Defendant's constitutional guarantees of freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
LET AN ORDER BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 
ORDER SUPPRESSING EVIDENCE 
Based on the foregoing Findings and Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, 
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i t e n j ; •Tsica_ ev:a- jnce mc . U C / V_ seized after 
Defend a n t w a s r e qu i r e d (:  : = :: : i t 1 :i i s in o t o r v e h i c ] e a r e 
suppressed. ^ 
D A T E D this f-"Y clay of August, 1996. 
Jam^^irr Shumate 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED: 
Gary W.\Pendldton 
Attorney l o r defendant 
* & . i 
Paul E. Dame 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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